Secret Downing Street memo

[smb]

In time-honoured tradition (well, you know me) I thought I’d post a copy of the now not-so-secret Downing Street memo. It is dated 23 July 2002.

Has anyone read it?

After visiting his US counterparts, 'C' (the head of MI6) is paraphrased in the minutes as saying the "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy".

It is evident that war had already been decided upon; of the things left to arrange was the eventual timing (swaying public opinion, etc.).

Take a look:



---START---

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Note by the Sunday Times: Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

---END---

[smb]

You can watch the original BBC programme in which this memo first came to light by clicking here.

[smb]

[/b]
By BOB HERBERT
May 9, 2005
New York Times

When Bob Woodward asked President Bush if he had consulted with his father about the decision to go to war in Iraq, the president famously replied, "There is a higher father that I appeal to."

It might have been better if Mr. Bush had stayed in closer touch with his earthly father. From the very beginning the war in Iraq has been an exercise in extreme madness, an absurd venture that would have been rich in comic possibilities except for the fact that many thousands of men, women and children have died, and tens of thousands have been crippled, burned or otherwise maimed.

The world now knows that the weapons of mass destruction were a convenient fiction. Less well known is that bumbling administration officials eagerly embraced the ravings of a foreign intelligence source known, believe it or not, as "Curveball." He helped promote the fantasy that Iraq had mobile laboratories for the manufacture of biological weapons.

The C.I.A. was warned that Curveball was as crazy as a Peter Sellers character, but the administration wanted this war in the way that a small child wants candy. Curveball's information was swallowed whole.

Amateurs and incompetents have run the war from the start, and fantasy has trumped reality at every turn. If a movie were to be made of the war, the appropriate director would be Mel Brooks. Even as the administration was listening to the likes of Curveball, it was showing the door to the Army's chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, who made the mistake of speaking the plain truth to officials fluent only in self-serving gibberish.

General Shinseki said it would take hundreds of thousands of troops to pacify Iraq. That was the end of his career.

Bush & Co. sent far fewer troops into the war, and many of them were never properly trained or equipped. The results have been nightmarish. Roadside bombs have caused 70 percent of American casualties in Iraq. The military was not prepared for this tactic and has had a miserable record providing protective armor for Humvees and other vehicles carrying soldiers and marines.

So G.I.'s from the wealthiest, most powerful nation in the history of the world have been dying because their nation wouldn't give them up-to-date combat vehicles.

As for training and preparedness, the scandal at Abu Ghraib is instructive. The problems there went far beyond the photos of Lynndie England and others humiliating the Iraqis under their control. We learned last week that Janis Karpinski, the brigadier general whose reserve military police unit was in charge of the prison, had been arrested for shoplifting at a military base in Florida in 2002. The same army that's scouring Iraq for insurgents and terrorists was apparently unaware of the arrest record of the woman assigned to such a sensitive position at Abu Ghraib.

Abu Ghraib was not an aberration. It was a symptom. This is a war in which the people in charge have had no idea what they were doing. One of the recommendations of Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, who investigated the scandal at Abu Ghraib, was that a team be sent to Iraq to teach some of the soldiers how to run prisons. How's that for an innovative step?

The United States is now stuck with a war it should never have started. The violence continues to rage out of control. The latest fantasy out of Washington is that somehow, miraculously, Iraqi troops will be able to take over and win the war that we couldn't.

The American public is becoming fed up and with good reason. Support for the war is declining and the reputation of the military is in jeopardy. The Army has been unable to meet its recruitment goals and the search for new soldiers is becoming desperate.

Last week, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers, told Congress that the war in Iraq was taking a toll on the military and would make combat operations elsewhere in the world more difficult. That was hardly a comforting thought as the administration was ramping up its rhetoric about North Korea.

If President Bush had consulted with his father before launching this clownish, disastrous war, he might have gotten some advice that would have pointed him in a different direction and spared his country - and the families of the many thousands dead - a lot of grief.[/ul]

www.nytimes.com/2005/05/09/opinion/09herbert.html?hp&oref=login

[JayUtah]

I'm confused; I thought the head of MI6 was "M".

[Al Johnston]

That might be MI5

Actually, I suspect they only use the code initials to stop the Parliamentary Accounts Committee finding out how few of them there actually are... ;D

[snakeriverrufus]

As I have told you elsewhere, you are presenting opinion as fact. Try and do better in the future.

[EdmondDantes]

It is July 2002. A British report notes that Prime Minister Tony Blair had “decided Britain must back any US assault and had ordered defence planners to begin the preparations for a new war in the Gulf.” The report claims “President Bush has already made up his mind. This is going to happen. It is a given … What we are waiting for is to be told the details of how and when and where.”


A shocking secret document recently leaked from Whitehall? No, it is the London Observer, in an article published July 21, 2002, p. 2. Two days later nearly identical language would be recorded in the so-called "Downing Street Memo," the minutes of a British cabinet meeting recorded by foreign-policy aide Matthew Rycroft and published “gotcha!” style days before the recent parliamentary election.

The memo raises three issues dear to the hearts of President Bush's critics — the timing of the decision to go to war with Saddam, the WMD rationale, and the use (read: abuse) of intelligence to create the casus belli. One paragraph in the memo conveniently contains all three:

C [Richard Dearlove, Head of MI-6] reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.

This and other excerpts have caused a furor on the American Left. Ralph Nader is calling for impeachment (again), and John Kerry has vowed to bring the matter to the Senate floor. Of course, the memo simply contains the impressions of an aide of the impressions of British-cabinet officials of the impressions of unnamed people they spoke to in the United States about what they thought the president was thinking. It is sad when hearsay thrice-removed raises this kind of ruckus, especially since a version had been reported three years ago. As smoking guns go, it is not high caliber.


Was the president committed to go to war with Iraq in July 2002?
In the summer of 2002 the policy of the United States was that Saddam Hussein should be removed from power. However, that does not mean that the decision to go to war had already been made.

Contingency planning for military operations against Iraq had begun as early as November 2001. This is no secret; the full timeline along with a wealth of details can be found in General Tommy Franks’s memoir American Solider. The plan that became known as OPLAN 1003V began to be put together in earnest in January 2002. The existence of war planning does not in itself prove that the use of force was inevitable. The purpose was to provide the president with the full range of credible alternatives for pursuing U.S. policy vis-à-vis Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Regime change had been U.S. policy since October 31, 1998, when President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act. It was not a state secret. On February 12, 2002, Colin Powell stated that "With respect to Iraq, it has long been, for several years now, a policy of the United States government that regime change would be in the best interests of the region, the best interests of the Iraqi people. And we are looking at a variety of options that would bring that about." The policy had bipartisan support; in June 2002 Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle said, "There is broad support for a regime change in Iraq. The question is how do we do it and when do we do it." It was also an international objective. On April 6, 2002, during a summit in Crawford, Texas, Prime Minister Blair said that regime change in Iraq was the policy of Great Britain, and that failure to act against Saddam was “not an option.” Blair pledged to support military action against Iraq, should that become necessary.

But had the president made up his mind that regime change would necessitate war? British journalist Trevor McDonald sparred with the president at the summit to try to get him to say so, but Bush stuck to his position. "I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go,” he said. "That's about all I'm willing to share with you."

What the president would not share was that other means were already being employed. The Downing Street Memo mentions “spikes of activity,” which probably refers to the program of covert operations begun against Iraq in the spring of 2002. This program was revealed the following June. Covert action against Iraq was hardly controversial. On June 16, 2002, on ABC’s This Week, House Democratic leader Richard Gephardt said that congressional leaders had been briefed on the secret directive by the White House, and stated that “It is an appropriate action to take. I hope it succeeds in its quest." Senator Joseph Biden, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said on Face the Nation, "If the covert action doesn't work, we better be prepared to move forward with another action, an overt action, and it seems to me that we can't afford to miss."

By the time the Downing Street Memo was written overt action against Iraq was being widely discussed, spurred in part by the July 5, 2002, publication of some of the war plans in the New York Times. (A previous version had been leaked in May by the Los Angeles Times.) The July 5 article led to rampant speculation about the inevitability of war, especially in Britain, and whomever Dearlove and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw were talking to then may well have been reflecting this mood. Moreover, either Dearlove or Straw, or one of their staff, may well have been the “Whitehall source” for the Observer piece two days before the cabinet meeting in question. Either that or they read it in the paper and repeated it at the meeting. My question: Had they ever spoken to the president to get his views first-person?


Why use WMDs as a rationale for war?
In the July 25, 2002, memo, Foreign Secretary Straw is said to have said,
We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force. The Attorney-General [Lord Goldsmith] said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change. The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD.

The WMDs justification for regime change was of course not new. On November 26, 2001, President Bush was asked what would happen if Saddam Hussein did not allow U.N. weapons inspectors back into Iraq. “He’ll find out,” he replied. The president had grown concerned with a scenario that came to be known in policy circles as the “nexus,” a potential relationship between rogue states, nuclear weapons, and terrorists acting as delivery systems. The president was referring to this in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union address when he said, “The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.” That the WMD issue was viewed as diplomatically useful, i.e., the easiest way to invoke international law, is not a surprise. Former Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz stated as much in his May 9-10, 2003, interview with Sam Tannenhaus of Vanity Fair (see also NRO analysis here).

The WMD approach worked exactly as intended. The Downing Street Memo is a very good analytical piece, and demonstrates a sound understanding of Saddam’s emotional state and probable future moves. The cabinet discusses presenting Saddam with an ultimatum to let the U.N. inspectors back in, knowing that this would either settle the question, or lead to recalcitrance and defiance on Saddam’s part, creating circumstances justifying intervention. As a strategic analysis, it is spot on, and it formed the road map for the eventual lead-up to war. Of course Saddam could have simply cooperated with the U.N. and denied the Coalition any pretext for intervening; was it the Coalition’s fault that he reverted to type and disregarded the U.N. resolution?

Unfortunately, so much emphasis was placed on the WMD rationale that the failure to turn up the expected weapons brought the entire regime-change effort into question. However, there were other ways the U.N. might have been engaged. The mismanagement and barefaced corruption of the “Oil for Food” program could have been leveraged for this same purpose.


Was the WMD Intelligence Faked?
Dearlove’s comments include the intriguing passage noted above, “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.” To the president’s critics, the meaning is clear — the WMD intelligence was being faked to support the rationale for intervention.

This passage needs some clarification. Maybe Rycroft or Dearlove could elaborate; by “fixed around” did they mean that intelligence was being falsified or that intelligence and information were being gathered to support the policy? There is nothing wrong with the latter — it is the purpose of the intelligence community to provide the information decision-makers need, and the marshal their resources accordingly.

But if Dearlove meant the former, he should be called upon to substantiate his charge. It can be weighed against the exhaustive investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on prewar intelligence assessments in Iraq. The committee examined this very question, whether the White House had pressured the intelligence community to reach predetermined conclusions supporting the case for war. The investigation found no evidence that “administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities” or that “the Vice President's visits to the Central Intelligence Agency were attempts to pressure analysts, were perceived as intended to pressure analysts by those who participated in the briefings on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, or did pressure analysts to change their assessments.” One would think that the Senate investigation would have somewhat more weight than the secondhand impressions of a foreign intelligence officer, but if Mr. Dearlove is able to elaborate, one hopes he will.

The memo itself notes that the British assumed that Saddam had limited WMD capabilities — and the September 24, 2002, British white paper on the topic spelled out exactly what Whitehall believed to be the facts. Surely, this was not the result of pressure from the vice president or any other American officials.

I think the fact that the Downing Street Memo had once been classified has a lot to do with its current notoriety. People might suppose that a “secret” document must ipso facto be important. But not always, and not in equal measure. The section of the memo dealing with strategic planning, yes, that was worth keeping close hold on. But the speculations about the inner workings of the American government? Sounds like the same things one could have heard on any newscast. Looking at the document in context it is hard to see what the commotion is about. Most of what might be thought sensational has already been written about elsewhere, to little fanfare. The charge of intelligence fraud (if it is such a charge) has already been investigated and found baseless. And the allegations that the president had already decided to go to war and was thus deceiving the American people are personal opinions based on unsubstantiated impressions from unnamed sources.

[smb]

Edmond, in future would you kindly provide a link and some indication of whose work you are cut and pasting? It will assist anyone who might care to respond to your message and also stop other individuals mistaking you for a plagiarist. Thank you.

Briefly:

James S. Robbins, National Review Online, writes: …the memo simply contains the impressions of an aide of the impressions of British-cabinet officials of the impressions of unnamed people they spoke to in the United States about what they thought the president was thinking. It is sad when hearsay thrice-removed raises this kind of ruckus…

[/b]
n. 1) second-hand evidence in which the witness is not telling what he/she knows personally, but what others have said to him/her. 2) a common objection made by the opposing lawyer to testimony when it appears the witness has violated the hearsay rule. 3) scuttlebutt or gossip.[/ul]James Robbins cleverly draws considerable distance between the consensus in Washington and the revelations in the leaked London memorandum, thereby implying the truth was somehow lost in translation.

Matthew Rycroft produced the minutes to the aforementioned meeting, which he personally attended (not hearsay). The meeting was recorded. Robbins’ argument partly rests on the premise that Rycroft was unqualified or incapable of producing an accurate written account of what transpired. But can he actually provide or point to any evidence showing Rycroft was unequal to the task required of him? No, he cannot.

For what its worth, the Downing Street press office has not disputed the accuracy or authenticity of the leaked minutes, but has said the document contains “nothing new”.

I would also remind Robbins that dim and illiterate types need not apply to become head of MI6. Similarly, the position of Foreign Secretary is not just awarded to any old fool. But here again his defence indirectly calls into question the competence, and glosses over the relevance, of the attendees. These individuals are not merely bystanders – they are partners and co-planners of the Iraq invasion-occupation, no less.

Robbins treats Sir Richard Dearlove’s U.S. counterparts in the same manner (who does he think the head of British intelligence traveled to Washington to talk with – an ‘out of the loop’ janitor?) and falsely identifies Bush as being the brainchild of the policy.

It is sad when people resort to reductionism and emphasis of this kind in order to discredit yet another valuable piece of evidence. It’s intellectual dishonesty.


In the summer of 2002 the policy of the United States was that Saddam Hussein should be removed from power. However, that does not mean that the decision to go to war had already been made. … The existence of war planning does not in itself prove that the use of force was inevitable.

True. But when you add Donald Rumsfeld’s leaked notes to the equation and consider one or two of Bush’s more private remarks ("F--k Saddam, we’re taking him out!"), the blatant cherry-picking of intelligence and the voluminous testimony from former insiders like the State Department’s Director of Policy and Planning, Richard Haas,

then a picture of an administration that had already committed itself to ousting Saddam using military force emerges, with - barring some unexpected miracle - the exact timing left to be resolved.


On April 6, 2002, during a summit in Crawford, Texas, Prime Minister Blair said that regime change in Iraq was the policy of Great Britain, and that failure to act against Saddam was “not an option.”

That is not entirely correct. Tony Blair frequently said the world would be better off without the likes of Saddam Hussein, but when it came to doing something about him, he was careful to avoid promoting “regime change” as policy and instead stuck to the non-existent threat Saddam’s non-existent WMD posed to the entire world.

Earlier I encouraged people to view the BBC programme in which this memo was given greater prominence. A partial transcript of the said programme follows:

Of course Saddam could have simply cooperated with the U.N. and denied the Coalition any pretext for intervening,

Simply not serious. The United States was intent on overthrowing the tyrant come what may. Robbins’ piece essentially acknowledges as much, but he can’t bring himself to say that the ‘nexus’ was a convenient fiction.


was it the Coalition’s fault that he [Saddam] reverted to type and disregarded the U.N. resolution?

The resolution and subsequent deliberations were configured so as to trigger a violation, and therefore to war.

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, so feel free to examine any of the other leaked briefing papers and memoranda.

Here is a snippet of the British ambassador to the United States describing his discussions with Mr Wolfowitz:

Here are six leaked documents in a zipped file:

cryptome.org/leaks-brief.zip (859KB)

straw020325.pdf
manning020314.pdf
meyer020318.pdf
ods020308.pdf
ricketts020322.pdf
fcolegal020308.pdf


Dearlove’s comments include the intriguing passage noted above, “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.” To the president’s critics, the meaning is clear — the WMD intelligence was being faked to support the rationale for intervention.

No, not necessarily faked. While it is true that a considerable amount of forgery was involved, it was equally shocking to find senior officials uncritically embracing dubious sources and their fanciful tales, particularly as they had been forewarned.


This passage needs some clarification. Maybe Rycroft or Dearlove could elaborate; by “fixed around” did they mean that intelligence was being falsified or that intelligence and information were being gathered to support the policy? There is nothing wrong with the latter…

There is much wrong when inexperienced administration officials greatly interfere in the intelligence gathering process, then disregard conclusions that run contrary to their wishful thinking and/or suppress findings that are likely to hinder the implementation of the said policy, as was extensively the case within U.S.-British administrations.


The charge of intelligence fraud (if it is such a charge) has already been investigated and found baseless.

Said the naked King to an enraptured audience.

[EdmondDantes]

Sorry, I thought I had copied that, too.

Are you Sun King?

Look, I have been through all this before on the old forum. I had transcripts from other meetings showing just the opposite. You will believe your sources and I will believe mine. If I get bored, I'll gather all that again.

NYT WASHINGTON, June 12 - A memorandum written by Prime Minister Tony Blair's cabinet office in late July 2002 explicitly states that the Bush administration had made no political decisions to invade Iraq, ...