I seriously have no idea why any of you are giving this fool so much as the time of day, let alone the benefit of your collective experience / knowledge on this or any other subject he flits back and forth between.
In the dictionary definition of "troll" it says "see any post by playdor"...
Last Edit: Nov 18, 2011 5:05:59 GMT -4 by Czero 101
Well to be honest, the only really new bit of information was that there was another planned flight when they got closed down.
Yeah... but I still found it an interesting read nonetheless...
In a way it's always been a shame that they didn't get there. Perhaps had the 5th test occured and been successful the Soviets might have done a single Lunar Mission as well.
I wonder what effect a successful manned Soviet Moon landing would have had on the Apollo hoax theories... I realize that in the 70's - assuming that's when the Soviets would / could have made it there - the "hoax movement" wasn't very big, if in existence at all, but it would be interesting to hear the arguments...
Research that digs back over the decades is providing an illuminating look at the former Soviet Union’s failed bid to send cosmonauts to the moon.
Between February 1969 and November 1972, Soviet space engineers repeatedly saw any dream of landing a cosmonaut on the moon literally go up in flames.
A succession of four failures of the Soviet-built N-1 mega-booster led to the project’s cancellation by decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
A fifth launch of the super-booster was slated in the fourth quarter of 1974, one that gleaned lessons learned from the earlier unsuccessful flights.
Up in smoke and millions of rubles spent, the terminated N-1-L3 space project was to be topped by a lunar system to support a two-cosmonaut crew on a maximum flight time of 13 days to the moon and back to Earth, with one crew member setting foot upon the lunar surface.
For years, Charles Vick, senior technical and policy analyst at GlobalSecurity.org, has been doggedly poring over on declassified files, talking with Soviet space program pioneers and culling through their memoirs and diaries.
In Vick’s latest unmasking of the N-1-L3 studies, he’s added new insight to his take on the Soviet manned lunar programs. He’s looking at it from both American and Russian perspectives, using satellite reconnaissance imagery — albeit purposely downgraded in clarity — and data from open sources.
“I would suggest that the race was far closer than publically perceived, based on declassified intelligence all the way back before Sputnik,” Vick said. “It was the Soviet system that ultimately defeated itself in the lunar race,” Vick told SPACE.com.
A host of U.S. intelligence gathering groups, from the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence and others, still hold tight what was gleaned by various satellites — as well as on-the-ground spies.
“That is an amazing story to be told … that hasn’t been told,” Vick said. Factory floor spies, even intelligence-gathering, down-range moles, he said.
In relation to N-1 launches, the U.S. also tapped into seismic sensors and atmospheric capabilities, even listening in on countdown demonstrations and in-flight telemetry streams transmitted during booster flights.
“It was intelligence in one form or another,” Vick said. “We could really feel for what was going on. We were able to do it a lot more than most people realized…it creates one huge picture.”
You report the DPS as being throttlable between 10% and 94%.
Although your page refers to Apollo 12, both the Apollo 11 Press Kit and Apollo Experience Report: Mission Planning for the LM - Descent and Ascent say it was only throttlable up to about 60%.
Can I get a double check on your figures?
Lunar Module Handbook, Volume 1 page 2.1-35 (pdf page 76 "Throttle Control") lists the throttle range as 10% - 92.5%, however, a more detailed explanation on page 2.3-2 (pdf page 253 last paragraph) says the following:
Descent engine throttling is controlled by the LGC or the astronauts. The throttling-range limitations are from minimum thrust (approximately 10% of 10,500 pounds) to approximately 65% and full throttle (approximately 92.5%). The range between 65% and 92.5% is a transient region that cannot be used for extended periods because excessive engine erosion occurs in this zone. Under normal conditions, the engine cannot be operated in the transient region because automatic throttle commands above 65% automatically produce a full throttle output. Only in case of malfunction can inadvertent throttling occur in the transient region, in which case manual correction must be made. Automatic throttle increase and decrease signals from the LGC are sent to an integrating counter in the DECA. The analog output of the DECA controls descent engine thrust. In the automatic mode, the thrust / translation controller assemblies (TTCA's) can be used by the astronauts to increase descent engine throttle (overriding the automatic throttle command); the TTCA cannot be used, however, to decrease the throttle command. (Refer to paragraph 126.96.36.199.1) In the manual throttle mode, the astronauts have complete control over descent engine thrust.
Paragraph 188.8.131.52.1 (pdf page 267) discusses the relationship between TTCA inputs and LGC throttle command outputs in the Automatic mode, the transition to Manual mode, and CMD THRUST (desired Commanded Thrust) and ENG THRUST (actual Engine Thrust) readouts.
The following article at NASA gives good information about recent efforts to gain insight for Orion design considerations by going back and looking at the CM/SM Umbilical connections on one of the remaining, flight-rated (though obviously not flight-ready) CSM's at Kennedy Space Center.