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Post by PUshift on Oct 21, 2010 17:00:14 GMT -4
Sounds similar to one of the contributing factors to this incident. No, absolutely, the worst one of all times! They weren´t even in an emergency (while still holding short before take-off), just then ignoring the missing takeoff-clearance AND outvoting the doubts of the 3rd crew member by the KLM captain who was considered as to be basically guilty. Arrogance at night in deep fog. Pilots are sometimes shown contrived films of impropriety to sharpen their sense for an early and honest awareness of silly things like "will my wife have to wait again" or "tonight I will get to watch my sporting news". And they are teached to notice if the team member feels queasy (nervousness, sweating, deep breath,...) and should take that seriously, reconsidering to stay open-minded. Some points can be compared to astronauts but I guess they had less need to fear about making mistakes due to daily routine, rather than to tiredness. Maybe on Apollo 123 they could finally have slammed the door of the lunar module, forgetting the key inside. No gas station, no locksmith. Now I remember Jim Lovell unintentionally re-initialised the IMU platform on Apollo 8. Not critical, but followed by a huge amount of work and the guarantee been spoofed by Anders and Borman for the rest of the mission.
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Post by banjomd on Oct 21, 2010 17:41:02 GMT -4
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Post by Data Cable on Oct 22, 2010 0:37:57 GMT -4
No prob, banj. That one was relatively fresh in my memory because the Nova documentary on it re-ran within the last few months.
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Post by ka9q on Oct 22, 2010 19:37:30 GMT -4
Being a pilot was considered essential, so that is why the scientists had to go through flight training. Jack Schmitt said that it was easier to train a scientist to be a pilot than to train a pilot to be a scientist. I always wonder how that comment went over with the rest of the astronaut corps.
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Post by PhantomWolf on Oct 22, 2010 22:16:15 GMT -4
Being a pilot was considered essential, so that is why the scientists had to go through flight training. Jack Schmitt said that it was easier to train a scientist to be a pilot than to train a pilot to be a scientist. I always wonder how that comment went over with the rest of the astronaut corps. I doubt that they were that upset by it because it's true. Piloting is easy, flying a plane is designed to be easy to do. You can teach a person to fly a plane in a couple of hours, you can teach them to fly well in a couple of months. In WW2 flight training for fighter pilots often consisted of showing them the plane, getting them to take off, fly a circuit, and land, if they survived that, they were ready. Learning to be a scientist takes up to 7 years, and some people haven't even figured it out even then.
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Post by ka9q on Oct 23, 2010 6:18:11 GMT -4
Maybe on Apollo 123 they could finally have slammed the door of the lunar module, forgetting the key inside. I've studied quite a bit of Apollo systems, and the two things that have always impressed me are a) how manual (i.e., un-automated) everything was and b) how little allowance the designs made for pilot error. None, basically. Oh, the switches had guards, and some of them even had safety covers. And there were a few interlocks. And you had to throw a "master arm" switch to enable some of the more spectacularly irreversible actions, like pyro firings. But it was still the case that throwing any number of those switches on the control panel at the wrong time would kill you.
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Post by banjomd on Oct 23, 2010 14:16:53 GMT -4
... But it was still the case that throwing any number of those switches on the control panel at the wrong time would kill you. "Now... Swigert could take it no more... He jumped up into the command module and scrounged around until he found a piece of paper and a small strip of silver duct tape....he...wrote a large, block-letter "NO" on the slip of paper and taped it to the LM JETT switch. He lifted the paper to make doubly sure it was the LM JETT switch and not the SM JETT switch he had taped it to. Then he checked again." from Lost Moon Jim Lovell & Jeffrey Kluger. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994
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Post by laurel on Oct 23, 2010 14:28:11 GMT -4
The vivid description of Swigert's mental image of an accidental LM jettison is one of the scariest parts of that book, IMO.
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Post by echnaton on Oct 23, 2010 17:47:55 GMT -4
Would the system have jettisoned the LM with the hatch open?
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Post by banjomd on Oct 23, 2010 19:09:37 GMT -4
Don't know but it sure worried Swigert! One thing for sure... it'd be a "bad hair day" if it happened!
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Post by Obviousman on Oct 23, 2010 20:34:15 GMT -4
That one is a classic. A causal factor in that incident was poor CRM. You had a junior flappy flying with a senior check captain - in fact he was the 'face' of KLM. The flappy knew they hadn't got a takeoff clearance, but when the captain throttled up for the second time, he just finished his readback and added something like " ...and we are at takeoff", indicating they were rolling. He was intimidated, and allowed the captain to continue when he knew they did not have a clearance. This was a time when he should have physically retarded the throttles and said clearly: "Captain, you must listen to me - we do not have a takeoff clearance yet!"Sounds similar to one of the contributing factors to this incident. No, absolutely, the worst one of all times! They weren´t even in an emergency (while still holding short before take-off), just then ignoring the missing takeoff-clearance AND outvoting the doubts of the 3rd crew member by the KLM captain who was considered as to be basically guilty. Arrogance at night in deep fog. Pilots are sometimes shown contrived films of impropriety to sharpen their sense for an early and honest awareness of silly things like "will my wife have to wait again" or "tonight I will get to watch my sporting news". And they are teached to notice if the team member feels queasy (nervousness, sweating, deep breath,...) and should take that seriously, reconsidering to stay open-minded. Some points can be compared to astronauts but I guess they had less need to fear about making mistakes due to daily routine, rather than to tiredness. Maybe on Apollo 123 they could finally have slammed the door of the lunar module, forgetting the key inside. No gas station, no locksmith. Now I remember Jim Lovell unintentionally re-initialised the IMU platform on Apollo 8. Not critical, but followed by a huge amount of work and the guarantee been spoofed by Anders and Borman for the rest of the mission.
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Post by astronaut23 on Oct 24, 2010 3:43:18 GMT -4
The good thing on Apollo is they didn't have clearance issues when leaving the moon. In fact Buzz Aldrin said, "Rodger understand, we're number 1 on the runway". ;D
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Post by ka9q on Oct 29, 2010 20:46:27 GMT -4
Would the system have jettisoned the LM with the hatch open? I think so, yes. With the relevant circuit breakers in and the master arm switch on, moving the LM jettison switch to the fire position would apply pyro battery voltage to the detonators. I don't know of any interlocks to ensure that the CM hatch was closed or even that no one was still in the LM. It was just one of the very many ways you could kill yourself (instantly or slowly) by throwing the wrong switch at the wrong time. That's one of the reasons the crews spent so many hours in training. Apollo crews trained for so long, simulating every phase of the flight so many times that many of the astronauts seemed to treat their actual flight as if it were just another simulation. When the Apollo 12 crew was debriefed, they talked as though they flew to the moon every day. Even when talking about the serious anomalies they had to work around during the launch, Pete Conrad said things like "Usually when this happens I do so and so, but this time I did such and such instead because..." I guess that was the idea, to make even a serious emergency seem as routine as possible.
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